Monday, December 7, 2015

Article Assessing the Role Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, the Swiss Minister, In Switzerland's Retreat from Bank Secrecy to Evade Other Country Taxes (12/7/15)

SWI Swissinfor.ch has this very interesting article on Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, the Swiss minister who oversaw and encouraged the Swiss retreat from bank secrecy. The minister who dismantled Swiss banking secrecy (Sissinfo.ch 12/6/15), here.  The article is very interesting, with various persons observing or involved in the process offering various levels of support as to her supervision of the process.  From the opening to get your interest:
As the curtain falls on Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf’s career in government, one of the most abiding legacies she leaves behind is the collapse of Swiss banking secrecy under her watch as Finance Minister. 
Her predecessor, Hans-Rudolf Merz, told the world in 2008 that it would “break its teeth on Swiss banking secrecy” if it tried to bring Switzerland to heel over tax evasion. But it has been the Swiss establishment spitting teeth after losing a bruising encounter with the United States that paved the way for a global surrender of secrecy. 
Praise and vitriol concerning Widmer-Schlumpf’s personal role in the process is spread out across the political spectrum. Her media comments throughout the crisis frequently inflamed rightwing politicians, who in 2012 demanded that the mandate to conduct banking secrecy negotiations be switched to the foreign ministry. 
There is one thing nearly everyone can agree on: the business model of employing secrecy to help foreign clients evade taxes in their own countries was defunct by the time Widmer-Schlumpf became Finance Minister in November 2010. 
But opinions diverge markedly when analysing exactly how this was achieved and judging whether Switzerland ended up with the best possible deal.

Saturday, December 5, 2015

The Cash Hoard Defense and ISIS Taxes (12/5/15)

Tax controversy enthusiasts will recall that one of the traditional defenses to the net worth method of proof often used in both civil and criminal cases is the cash hoard defense.  For an explanation of the cash hoard defense, see IRM 9.5.9.5  (11-05-2004), Net Worth Method of Proof, here.  The net worth method may be stated simply, although the concept may be difficult in application because it takes a lot of work:  The method is a simple comparison of the net worth at the beginning of the period and at the end of the period, with the assumption that increases in net worth from the beginning to the end coupled with expenditures in the period are taxable income unless otherwise explained (such as by gifts, unrealized appreciation in value, etc.).  The cash hoard defense argues that the agent incorrectly used the method because the agent understated beginning net worth by leaving out a "cash hoard" or other assets acquired before the beginning that contributed to the ending net worth or expenditures in the period.  Since cash is the usual claimed "hoard," this is referred to as the cash hoard defense.  E.g., 9.5.9.7.4.8  (11-05-2004), Cash on Hand Decrease, here. The DOJ Tax Criminal Tax Manual provides guidance on how to rebut the cash hoard defense.  See DOJ CTM 31.07[1], here

I heard an interesting application of the cash hoard defense today.  Planet Money had an episode title Auditing ISIS.  The episode is here.  The episode discusses a month's budget for an ISIS controlled area that listed income and expenditures.  The income was quite substantial, consisting significantly of oil sales, sales of antiquities, confiscations, various fines and penalties, and taxes, as well as other miscellaneous income.  I was particularly interested in the discussion of taxes.  The moderator interviewed a former resident of ISIS controlled territory who talked about the taxes and other compulsory exactions.  Apparently, ISIS has some form of income tax and will, perhaps arbitrarily, determine the amount of income and the tax that should be paid.  If the ISIS tax police find assets in your home (say cash or some valuable asset such as gold items), they would claim that is part of the income that is subject to tax.  The hapless "taxpayer" -- if that is the right word to use -- might, with valuable assets like gold at least, claim that those assets were from long ago, such as wedding gifts and therefore should not be considered for that particular genre of income tax.  I am not sure how often that would work in the ISIS controlled regions (wonder if ISIS keeps database entries on that), but I guess it is worth a try.  I am not sure I would want to be a lawyer presenting that defense to the ISIS tax police.

The FYE 2015 IRS CI Report (12/5/15)

CI has issued its FYE 2015 report, here.  The report is similar to past reports in presenting the materials.  I offer certain excerpts from the report below.  One key theme of the report is the decreases in budget, leading to decreasing staff resources and decreasing investigative results.  See on this theme my recent blog, Good Article on the State of CI (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 12/3/15), here. IRS CI reports some statistics in the report and does have a web page with even more statistics, here, including some presented in the report.  I will discuss the statistics on the investigative results when the FYE 2015 IRS Data Book comes out that will offer the statistics in slightly different ways that will permit me to dig out certain key statistics not offered in the report.

Here are the excerpts related principally to offshore account matters
[*1]  
The Swiss Bank program continued to provide solid leads and information that we are using to develop other cases around the world. Bank Leumi admitted to assisting U.S. taxpayers in hiding assets in offshore bank accounts, disclosed more than 1,500 U.S. account holders and agreed to pay a total of $270 million. This was the first time an Israeli bank has admitted to such criminal conduct. 
[*17] 
Abusive Tax Schemes 
Within the Abusive Tax Schemes program, CI focuses on the investigation of promoters and clients who willfully participate in domestic and/or offshore tax schemes for the purpose of violating the tax laws. Participants in these abusive schemes usually create structures such as trusts, foreign corporations and partnerships for the purpose of making it appear that a trustee, nominee, non-resident alien or other foreign entity is the owner of the assets and income, when in fact the true ownership and control remains with a United States taxpayer. 
[*18] 
Four Pennsylvania Family Members Sentenced for Tax Fraud 
On July 23, 2015, in Allentown, Pennsylvania, four Lancaster County family members were sentenced to prison for their participation in a long-term, complex and concerted effort to avoid taxation. In October 2010, Chester A. Bitterman Jr. and his sons, Craig L. Bitterman, C. Grant Bitterman and Curtis L. Bitterman, were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States. Craig Bitterman was additionally convicted of obstruction of justice. Prior to sentencing, the defendants paid $437,000 in restitution to the IRS. The four were sentenced as follows: Craig L. Bitterman was sentenced to 36 months in prison; C. Grant Bitterman was sentenced to 21 months in prison; Curtis L. Bitterman was sentenced to 21 months in prison; and Chester A. Bitterman Jr. was sentenced to three years’ probation. According to court documents, from 1996 to 2005, the Bittermans owned and operated the Bitterman Scale Company. To conceal their income and assets from the IRS, the Bittermans used aliases, offshore bank accounts and a complex series of sham paper transactions to disguise income. The defendants transferred their personal and business assets to sham trusts purchased from the Commonwealth Trust Company, an organization that marketed trust products to clients for the purpose of avoiding federal income tax payment. The trusts were used to make it appear as though the defendants had little or no assets or income. In reality, the defendants retained complete access and control over their funds. 
[*33] 
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 
The immense growth in the utilization of global financial markets presents new challenges to tax administration worldwide. CI’s Office of International Operations (IO) promotes a comprehensive international strategy in responding to global financial crimes and provides support in combating offshore tax evasion. Since the means to evade taxes and commit fraud is not limited by sovereign borders, international collaboration is vital to CI’s efforts to combat offshore tax evasion and fraud committed by individuals.
CI has special agent attachés strategically stationed in 10 foreign countries. Attachés continue to build strong alliances with our foreign government and law enforcement partners. These strong alliances provide CI with the ability to develop international case leads and to support domestic investigations with an international nexus. CI attachés are especially focused on promoters from international banking institutions who facilitate United States taxpayers in evading their United States tax requirements. There are several senior analysts assigned to CI headquarters who are responsible for managing program areas designed to generate investigative leads. 
[*34] 
In 2015 IO created the Investigation Development and Support Unit (IDS). The IDS is a newly created section of IO that was formed when the former International Lead Development Center (ILDC), Offshore Voluntary Compliance group and the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) were merged together and placed under one management structure. This new unit is located in the Office of International Strategy and Policy. The new unit continues to offer its resources to the field in a case support capacity
while also focusing on developing significant financial investigations independent of the leads being received. 
The growth of the CI footprint internationally has increased the opportunities for case development. The IDS is specifically tasked with conducting research on potential international criminal investigations. In addition, CI has personnel assigned to Interpol and the International Organized Crime Intelligence and Operations Center (IOC-2) to combat the threats posed by international criminal organizations, assist in joint investigations and the apprehension of international fugitives. 
* * * *
Examples of international investigations adjudicated in FY 2015 include: 
Tax Return Preparers Sentenced for Hiding Offshore Account and Assisting Wealthy Clients to Hide Millions in Secret Accounts 
On Aug. 10, 2015, in Los Angeles, California, David Kalai was sentenced to 36 months in prison, three years of supervised release, with a condition of home confinement to last the entire term of release, and ordered to pay a $286,000 fine. Nadav Kalai, David Kalai’s son, was sentenced to 50 months in prison, three years of supervised release and ordered to pay a $10,000 fine. The Kalais were principals of United Revenue Service Inc. (URS), a tax return preparation business with 12 offices located throughout the United States. On Dec. 19, 2014, the Kalais were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the IRS and two counts of willfully failing to file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR). The Kalais advised and assisted their high net-worth clients in concealing millions of dollars of assets and income in secret foreign bank accounts and filing false federal income tax returns. The Kalais also maintained a secret offshore account of their own at Bank Leumi in Luxembourg in the name of a foreign sham corporation and failed to disclose the account to the IRS or the U.S. Treasury. The Kalais purposefully prepared false individual income tax returns for their URS clients that did not disclose the clients’ foreign financial accounts nor report the income earned from those accounts. In order to conceal the clients’ income, ownership and control of assets from the IRS, the Kalais incorporated offshore companies in Belize and elsewhere and helped clients open secret bank accounts at the Luxembourg locations of two Israeli banks, Bank Leumi and Bank B. Three URS clients who testified at the Kalais’ trial have pleaded guilty to tax felonies arising from their participation in the scheme. The Kalais each failed to file an FBAR for calendar years 2008 and 2009 with respect to a foreign account held at Bank Leumi in Luxembourg.
[*41] 
Bank Secrecy Act 
The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) mandates the reporting of certain currency transactions conducted with a financial institution, the disclosure of foreign bank accounts, and the reporting of the transportation of currency across United States borders. Through the analysis of 
BSA data, CI has experienced success in identifying significant and complex money laundering schemes and other financial crimes. CI is the largest consumer of BSA data.
The CI BSA Program has grown substantially since its inception in the early 2000s when CI helped establish the initial 41 Suspicious Activity Report Review Teams (SAR-RT). The mission then, as it is today, was to scrutinize BSA data to identify and target significant illicit financial criminal activity. The current BSA program is comprised of participation in 94 SAR-RTs (one in each judicial district and led by the responsible U.S. Attorney Office), and sponsorship and management of 55 Financial Crimes Task Forces (FCTF) throughout the country. The FCTF involves collaboration between CI and state or local law enforcement agencies for the purpose of identifying and investigating specific geographic area illicit financial crimes, including BSA violations, money laundering, narcotics trafficking, terrorist financing and even tax evasion. More than 150 state or local agencies have joined FCTFs across the country and have detailed more than 350 law enforcement officers to become Task Force Officers. The Task Force Officers are granted the authority to investigate money laundering and BSA violations under the direction of CI. All task force investigations are conducted at the federal level and IRS-CI policies regarding authorized investigative techniques, enforcement actions, and seizures are followed by all the participants. CI strengthens the BSA program area by maintaining excellent working relationships with anti-money laundering officials within the financial industry. Additionally, CI also maintains excellent relationships with IRS civil functions responsible for Title 31 Compliance and other external sources. These relationships are developed at the headquarters and field office levels through outreach activities. 
[*42] 
In FY 2015, FinCEN approved two Geographic Targeting Orders (GTOs). On Oct. 2, 2014, FinCEN approved a GTO for certain businesses located within the Los Angeles Fashion District. The order imposes additional reporting and recordkeeping obligations on certain trades and businesses located within the Los Angeles Fashion District. The GTO will enhance the IRS’ ability to identify and pursue cases against person and businesses engaged in the illicit movement of U.S. currency to Mexico and Columbia using the black market peso exchange, sometimes known as trade based money laundering. In February 2015, the order was extended for another 180 days. On April 21, 2015, FinCEN approved a GTO for the Miami area (including surrounding counties) to enforce additional record keeping requirements on check cashing businesses/MSBs. To help combat identity theft and refund fraud, FinCEN added additional requirements for cashing Treasury checks and Refund Anticipation Loans (RAL). Additional record keeping requirements include but are not limited to requesting the customer provide two forms of identification, a photo ID and a fingerprint on the check. 
[*46] 
Under Forfeitures:
BNP Paribas S.A. (Washington DCFO) – On May 1, 2015, BNP Paribas was sentenced to afive-year term of probation and ordered to forfeit more than $3.9 billion. BNP Paribas is the largest bank in France and one of the five largest banks in the world in terms of total assets. The sentencing is the first time a financial institution has been convicted and sentenced for violations of U.S. economic sanctions and the total financial penalty including the forfeiture and criminal fine is the largest financial penalty ever imposed in a criminal case.

Friday, December 4, 2015

Two Related Banks Obtain NPAs under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (12/4/15)

On December 3,, 2015, DOJ announced here that  EFG Bank European Financial Group SA, Geneva (EFG Group), and EFG Bank AG (EFG Bank) have jointly resolved their Category 2 submissions and entered NPAs under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.  The joint penalties are 29.988 million.

The relationships of the banks and their higher level entities are:
EFG Group is a holding company and Swiss bank based in Geneva, Switzerland, which is owned by European Financial Group EFG (Luxembourg) SA.  EFG Group is the direct and controlling shareholder of EFG International AG, which is a holding company.  EFG Bank, which is headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, and has another Swiss office in Geneva, is the main Swiss private banking subsidiary of EFG International AG.  EFG Bank also has representative offices and branches in Asia and the Americas.  In 2003, EFG Bank acquired the Geneva-based bank Banque Édouard Constant (BEC).  While EFG Group and EFG Bank are participating jointly in the Swiss Bank Program, these two EFG banks are separate legal entities with distinct management and board control.
Some interesting excerpts (bold face by JAT):
One EFG Bank private banker had an established third-party client referral model for U.S. clients that involved two lawyers in the United States, one U.S. accountant and one Swiss fiduciary company.  At least one member of EFG’s senior management approved and supported this private banker’s relationship with one of the two U.S. lawyers.  This same U.S. lawyer asked the EFG private banker not to travel into the United States with a computer and requested that they communicate about U.S. taxpayer clients through faxes rather than email.  The EFG private banker responded, “[R]ight – next travel I travel will take no computer with me – I will then buy me one at BestBuy and leave it there for use when I am travelling. So I never will cary [sic] a computer over the border.” 
* * * * 
EFG also serviced certain U.S. clients with undeclared accounts held in the names of insurance companies and not the actual beneficial owner of the funds, known colloquially as an insurance wrapper.  Insurance wrappers were marketed by third-party providers in the wake of the UBS investigation as a means of disguising the beneficial ownership of U.S. clients.  These particular accounts were all held in the name of insurance providers.  By the operation of Swiss bank secrecy laws, the U.S. client’s ownership would not be disclosed to U.S. authorities, including the IRS.  
* * * * 
With respect to assets transferred to accounts in countries other than the United States and Switzerland upon account closure, significant amounts were transferred to numerous other jurisdictions.  For example, the following amounts were transferred in connection with the closure of U.S.-related accounts:
  • At least $12,680,000 was transferred to Bermuda;
  • At least $12,460,000 was transferred to Guernsey;
  • At least $25,200,000 was transferred to Liechtenstein;
  • At least $12,260,000 was transferred to Monaco;
  • At least $25,000,000 was transferred to Luxembourg; and
  • At least $33,550,000 was transferred to Hong Kong.
In connection with the closure of U.S.-related accounts, significant amounts also were transferred to the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Israel, Panama, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates.
The banks will be added to the IRS's Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, here.  As indicated in the last quoted paragraph, accountholders in the listed banks joining OVDP after one of their banks are listed will be subject to the 50% penalty in OVDP (provided that they do not opt out, in which case, who knows).

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
17
5
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
91
60
$600,675,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
130

$4,071,225,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.





Thursday, December 3, 2015

IRS Use of Cell-Site Simulators (Also called Stingray) to Retrieve Information About and From Cell Phones (12/3/15)

The IRS's use of so-called cell-site simulators have been in the news recently.  I thought it might be helpful to introduce readers the topic.  First, I will provide some information on the scope of the technology as I understand it and then the legal issues from its use by law enforcement, including the IRS.  I am by no means an expert in the technology and have no unique insight into how the IRS or other law enforcement agencies are using the technology.  I am essentially repeating what I read in the news and tax media.

Nature of the Technology

The American Civil Liberties Union (commonly referred to as "ACLU") has this very brief description, here, of the technology:
Stingrays, also known as "cell site simulators" or "IMSI catchers," are invasive cell phone surveillance devices that mimic cell phone towers and send out signals to trick cell phones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information. When used to track a suspect's cell phone, they also gather information about the phones of countless bystanders who happen to be nearby.
Wikipedia has this discussion, here, of the Harris Corporation version, called Stingray, which seems to the most popular version used by law enforcement and the version used by the IRS.  Wikipedia further says that the word "Stingray has also become a generic name to describe these kinds of devices." Wikipedia's general description is (footnotes omitted):
The StingRay is an IMSI-catcher (International Mobile Subscriber Identity), a controversial cellular phone surveillance device, manufactured by Harris Corporation.Initially developed for the military and intelligence community, the StingRay and similar Harris devices are in widespread use by local and state law enforcement agencies across the United States and possibly covertly in the United Kingdom. 
* * * * 
The StingRay is an IMSI-catcher with both passive (digital analyzer) and active (cell site simulator) capabilities. When operating in active mode, the device mimics a wireless carrier cell tower in order to force all nearby mobile phones and other cellular data devices to connect to it. 
The features of the technology that are apparently of most concern are what Wikipedia calls the "Active Mode Operations" and "Capabilities." 
Active mode operations 
1. Extracting stored data such as International Mobile Subscriber Identity ("IMSI") numbers and Electronic Serial Number ("ESN"),
2. Writing cellular protocol metadata to internal storage
3. Forcing an increase in signal transmission power,
4. Forcing an abundance of radio signals to be transmitted
5. Interception of communications content
6. Tracking and locating the cellular device user,
7. Conducting a denial of service attack
8. Encryption key extraction.
9. radio jamming for either general denial of service purposes or to aid in active mode protocol rollback attacks
* * * * 
Active (cell site simulator) capabilities 
In active mode, the StingRay will force each compatible cellular device in a given area to disconnect from its service provider cell site (e.g., operated by Verizon, AT&T, etc.) and establish a new connection with the StingRay. In most cases, this is accomplished by having the StingRay broadcast a pilot signal that is either stronger than, or made to appear stronger than, the pilot signals being broadcast by legitimate cell sites operating in the area. A common function of all cellular communications protocols is to have the cellular device connect to the cell site offering the strongest signal. StingRays exploit this function as a means to force temporary connections with cellular devices within a limited area. 
Extracting data from internal storage 
During the process of forcing connections from all compatible cellular devices in a given area, the StingRay operator needs to determine which device is a desired surveillance target. This is accomplished by downloading the IMSI, ESN, or other identifying data from each of the devices connected to the StingRay. In this context, the IMSI or equivalent identifier is not obtained from the cellular service provider or from any other third-party. The StingRay downloads this data directly from the device using radio waves. 
In some cases, the IMSI or equivalent identifier of a target device is known to the StingRay operator beforehand. When this is the case, the operator will download the IMSI or equivalent identifier from each device as it connects to the StingRay. When the downloaded IMSI matches the known IMSI of the desired target, the dragnet will end and the operator will proceed to conduct specific surveillance operations on just the target device. 
In other cases, the IMSI or equivalent identifier of a target is not known to the StingRay operator and the goal of the surveillance operation is to identify one or more cellular devices being used in a known area. For example, if visual surveillance is being conducted on a group of protestors, a StingRay can be used to download the IMSI or equivalent identifier from each phone within the protest area. After identifying the phones, locating and tracking operations can be conducted, and service providers can be forced to turn over account information identifying the phone users.
* * * *
Interception of communications content[edit]
By way of software upgrades, the StingRay and similar Harris products can be used to intercept GSM communications content transmitted over-the-air between a target cellular device and a legitimate service provider cell site. The StingRay does this by way of the following man-in-the-middle attack: (1) simulate a cell site and force a connection from the target device, (2) download the target device's IMSI and other identifying information, (3) conduct "GSM Active Key Extraction" to obtain the target device's stored encryption key, (4) use the downloaded identifying information to simulate the target device over-the-air, (5) while simulating the target device, establish a connection with a legitimate cell site authorized to provide service to the target device, (6) use the encryption key to authenticate the StingRay to the service provider as being the target device, and (7) forward signals between the target device and the legitimate cell site while decrypting and recording communications content. 
The "GSM Active Key Extraction" performed by the StingRay in step three merits additional explanation. A GSM phone encrypts all communications content using an encryption key stored on its SIM card with a copy stored at the service provider. While simulating the target device during the above explained man-in-the-middle attack, the service provider cell site will ask the StingRay (which it believes to be the target device) to initiate encryption using the key stored on the target device. Therefore, the StingRay needs a method to obtain the target device's stored encryption key else the man-in-the-middle attack will fail. 
GSM primarily encrypts communications content using the A5/1 call encryption cypher. In 2008 it was reported that a GSM phone's encryption key can be obtained using $1,000 worth of computer hardware and 30 minutes of cryptanalysis performed on signals encrypted using A5/1. However, GSM also supports an export weakened variant of A5/1 called A5/2. This weaker encryption cypher can be cracked in real-time. While A5/1 and A5/2 use different cypher strengths, they each utilize the same underlying encryption key stored on the SIM card. Therefore, the StingRay performs "GSM Active Key Extraction" during step three of the man-in-the-middle attack as follows: (1) instruct target device to use the weaker A5/2 encryption cypher, (2) collect A5/2 encrypted signals from target device, and (3) perform cryptanalysis of the A5/2 signals to quickly recover the underlying stored encryption key. Once the encryption key is obtained, the StingRay uses it to comply with the encryption request made to it by the service provider during the man-in-the-middle attack.
 The following is a very good article with information about Stingray.  Larry Greenemeier, What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance? (Scientific American 6/25/15), here.

Federal Agencies Using the Technology

The technology is used by numerous federal agencies, including:  FBI, IRS, the Armed Services, and the NSA.  The technology is used also by many state agencies.

Constitutional Issues

The question is what Constitutional protections need to be observed in the use of the technology by law enforcement.  The basic protection is the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures by the Government, a protection applying to both State and Federal Governments.  The text of the Fourth Amendment is short:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment obviously does not speak to a person's right to privacy with respect to their cell phone's location and internal data.  But, the Fourth Amendment does not address many features of life after its adoption -- e.g., cars.  Generally, speaking through the process of constitutional interpretation and application in specific cases, the Fourth Amendment is applied to many of those features of modern life.

The issue is whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the type of investigation and electronic intrusion into cell phones allowed by the cell-site simulator.  I won't try to deal with the complex constitution and interpretive issues in any detail.  Suffice it to say, law enforcement recognizes that Fourth Amendment concerns are raised by its use.

DOJ Policy of 9/3/15

Most particularly, in response to public concerns about the use of the technology, on 9/3/15, the DOJ announced its revised policy for use.  See press release titled Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, here.  The following are the key excerpts:
To enhance privacy protections, the new policy establishes a set of required practices with respect to the treatment of information collected through the use of cell-site simulators.  This includes data handling requirements and an agency-level implementation of an auditing program to ensure that data is deleted consistent with this policy.  For example, when the equipment is used to locate a known cellular device, all data must be deleted as soon as that device is located, and no less than once daily.
Additionally, the policy makes clear that cell-site simulators may not be used to collect the contents of any communication in the course of criminal investigations.  This means data contained on the phone itself, such as emails, texts, contact lists and images, may not be collected using this technology. 
While the department has, in the past, obtained appropriate legal authorizations to use cell-site simulators, law enforcement agents must now obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause before using a cell-site simulator.  There are limited exceptions in the policy for exigent circumstances or exceptional circumstances where the law does not require a search warrant and circumstances make obtaining a search warrant impracticable.  Department components will be required to track and report the number of times the technology is deployed under these exceptions.
The link to the actual policy is here.  The policy has a good statement as to the background and history of the technology, its use and its constitutional implications.  Key excerpts are:
Basic Uses 
Law enforcement agents can use cell-site simulators to help locate cellular devices whose unique identifiers are already known to law enforcement, or to determine the unique identifiers of an unknown device by collecting limited signaling information from devices in the simulator user's vicinity. This technology is. one tool among many traditional law enforcement techniques, and is deployed only in the fraction of cases in which the capability is best suited to achieve specific public safety objectives.  
How They Function 
Cell-site simulators, as governed by this policy, function by transmitting as a cell tower. In response to the signals emitted by the simulator, cellular devices in the proximity of the device identify the simulator as the most attractive cell tower in the area and thus transmit signals to the simulator that identify the device in the same way that they would with a networked tower. A cell-site simulator receives and uses an industry standard unique identifying number assigned by a device manufacturer or cellular network provider. When used to locate a known cellular device, a cell-site simulator initially receives the unique identifying number from multiple devices in the vicinity of the simulator. Once the cell-site simulator identifies the specific cellular device for which it is looking, it will obtain the signaling information relating only to that particular phone. When used to identify an unknown device, the cell-site simulator obtains signaling information from non-target devices in the target's vicinity for the limited purpose of distinguishing the target device. 
What They Do and Do Not Obtain 
By transmitting as a cell tower, cell-site simulators acquire the identifying information from cellular devices. This identifying information is limited, however. Cell-site simulators provide only the relative signal strength and general direction of a subject cellular telephone; they do not function as a GPS locator, as they do not obtain or download any location information from the device or its applications. Moreover, cell-site simulators used by the Department must be configured as pen registers, and may not be used to collect the contents of any communication, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). This includes any data contained on the phone itself: the simulator does not remotely capture emails, texts, contact lists, images or any other data from the phone. In addition, Department cell-site simulators do not provide subscriber account information (for example, an account holder's name, address, or telephone number). 
I am not sure if the latter description as not accessing cell-phone content location via GPS and not accessing cell phone content are limitations of the technology or limitations that DOJ puts on its use of the technology..

The DOJ policy is:
LEGAL PROCESS AND COURT ORDERS 
The use of cell-site simulators is permitted only as authorized by law and policy. While the Department has, in the past, appropriately obtained authorization to use a cell-site simulator by seeking an order pursuant to the Pen Register Statute, as a matter of policy, law enforcement agencies must now obtain a search warrant supported by probable cause and issued pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or the applicable state equivalent), except as provided below. 
As a practical matter, because prosecutors will need to seek authority pursuant to Rule 41 and the Pen Register Statute, prosecutors should, depending on the rules in their jurisdiction, either (1) obtain a warrant that contains all information required to be included in a pen register order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (or the state equivalent), or (2) seek a warrant and a pen register order concurrently. The search warrant affidavit also must reflect the information noted in the immediately following section of this policy ("Applications for Use of Cell-Site Simulators"). 
There are two circumstances in which this policy does not require a warrant prior to the use of a cell-site simulator. 
1. Exigent Circumstances under the Fourth Amendment  
Exigent circumstances can vitiate a Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, but cell-site simulators sti11 require court approval in order to be lawfully deployed. An exigency that excuses the need to obtain a warrant may arise when the needs of law enforcement are so compelling that they render a warrantless search objectively reasonable. When an officer has the requisite probable cause, a variety of types of exigent circumstances may justify dispensing with a warrant. These include the need to protect human life or avert serious injury; the prevention of the imminent destruction of evidence; the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; or the prevention of escape by a suspect or convicted fugitive from justice.  
In this circumstance, the use of a cell-site simulator still must comply with the Pen Register Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3121, et seq., which ordinarily requires judicial authorization before use of the cell-site simulator, based on the government's certification that the information sought is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. In addition, in the subset of exigent situations where circumstances necessitate emergency pen register auth01ity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3125 (or the state equivalent), the emergency must be among those listed in Section 3125: immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury to any person; conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime; an immediate threat to a national security interest; or an ongoing attack on a protected computer (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030) that constitutes a crime punishabl,e by a term of imprisonment greater than one year. In addition, the operator must obtain the requisite internal approval to use a pen reg ister before using a cell-site simulator. In order to comply with the terms of this policy and with 18 U.S.C. § 3125,3 the operator must contact the duty AUSA in the local U.S. Attorney's Office, who will then call the DOJ Command Center to reach a supervisory attorney in the Electronic Surveillance Unit (ESU) of the Office of Enforcement Operations.  Assuming the parameters of the statute are met, the ESU attorney will contact a DAAG in the Criminal Division5 and provide a short briefing. If the DAAG approves, the ESU attorney will relay the verbal authorization to the AUSA, who must also apply for a court order within 48 hours as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3125. Under the provisions of the Pen Register Statute, use under emergency pen-trap authority must end when the information sought is obtained, an application for an order is denied, or 48 hours has passed, whichever comes first.  
2. Exceptional Circumstances Where the Law Does Not Require a Warrant  
There may also be other circumstances in which, although exigent circumstances do not exist, the law does not require a search warrant and circumstances make obtaining a search warrant impracticable. In such cases, which we expect to be very limited, agents must first obtain approval from executive-level personnel at the agency's headquarters and the relevant U.S. Attorney, and then from a Criminal Division DAAG. The Criminal Division shall keep track of the number of times the use of a cell-site simulator is approved under this subsection, as well as the circumstances underlying each such use.
In this circumstance, the use of a cell-site simulator still must comply with the Pen Register Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3121, et seq., which ordinarily requires judicial authorization before use of the cell-site simulator, based on the government's certification that the information sought is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. In  addition, if circumstances necessitate emergency pen register authority, compliance with the provisions outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3125 is required (see provisions in section l directly above)
IRS Use of Cell-Site Simulators

Now, we get to the IRS's use of the technology, which was the subject of testimony by IRS Commissioner Koskinen before Congress and then letters from Koskinen to Congress clarifying his remarks.  Without getting into how the IRS used its simulator in the past, Koskinen advised Senator Wyden by letter dated 11/25/15 that the IRS has a moratorium on use and will issue its internal guidance on November 30, substantially mirroring the DOJ rules noted above.

I will have a posting later on the new IRS guidance when it becomes public.

Other materials:

There are references in the DOJ policy about pen registers and the Pen Register Statute.  I thought the following from Wikipedia here might be helpful:
A pen register, or dialed number recorder (DNR), is an electronic device that records all numbers called from a particular telephone line. The term has come to include any device or program that performs similar functions to an original pen register, including programs monitoring Internet communications. 
The United States statutes governing pen registers are codified under 18 U.S.C., Chapter 206.
The cell-site simulator obviously can function as a pen register device and, since there are statutes dealing with the use of those devices and the requirements, those statutes would apply to this use.

Addendum 12/3/15 9:00pm:

The issues are much the same, in a slightly different context, for accessing emails stored on internet or email service providers' web storage.  The issue is ultimately whether, in order to access email content, the investigating agency is required to obtain an SCA warrant which requires showing of probable cause under FRCrP 41.  Some of the information other than content may be obtained under a lesser showing for a "§ 2703(d) Court Order when the Government provides “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought “are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."  All of it relates to reasonable expectations of privacy -- a Fourth Amendment concern -- and the protections required or needed to protect a reasonable zone of privacy.  The blogs in that context are (presented in reverse chronological order to show the development over time):

  • The Stored Communications Act and Emails: An Overview (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 4/25/15), here.
  • Guest Blog on Stored Communications Act Reach to Cloud Storage Outside the U.S. (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 4/25/15), here.
  • IRS to Require Search Warrants for All Emails from ISPs (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 5/15/13), here.
  • Are Emails Stored on the ISP's Computer Subject to Fourth Amendment Protections? (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 7/28/12), here.

Good Article on the State of CI (12/3/15)

David Voracos of BloombergBusiness has a good article this morning on staffing and funding problems for IRS's Criminal Investigation ("CI").  IRS Loses Hundreds of Criminal Agents as Tax Cheats Take Heart (BloombergBusiness 12/3/15), here.  The immediate impetus for the article is the IRS's FYE 2015 Report, here.  The release announcing the report, IR-2015-135 is here.  I will discuss the report in a future blog entry after I have time to review it in more detail.  I think, however, that the cited article offers some good background for the state of CI via some interviews and analysis not directly appearing in the report.  Some excerpts from the article:
Tax cheats can breathe a little easier. The gun-toting Internal Revenue Service investigators who send felons to prison are retiring in droves and there’s no one to replace them. 
IRS Criminal Investigation agents are the elite special forces in the never-ending war on tax evasion. They are feared among criminals for their unmatched ability to follow the money, assess net worth and find fraud in corporate books. They have been at the center of major tax and money-laundering cases involving Swiss banks, FIFA soccer officials, and the Costa Rican digital currency company, Liberty Reserve. 
Despite those victories, these are dark days for CI agents. Scandals and budget wars between the Obama administration and House Republicans are thinning out the ranks of the IRS’s 84,000 employees. By the end of next year, the number of criminal agents is projected to fall by 21 percent since 2011. 
* * * * 
“It’s hard to continue to work in an environment when your agency is constantly bashed, and your funding is slashed,” said Toni Weirauch, 52, who retired as a top CI manager in May. “I loved my career but I was exhausted by the end.” 
* * * * 
As they head for the exits, the bright minds that have researched and built complex cases for decades are no longer available to mentor replacements, should they ever get hired. The number of investigators fell to 2,316 this year from 2,739 in 2011 and are projected to hit 2,166 next year. Since 2013, only 45 new agents have been hired, and the IRS has said it doesn’t expect to add any more in 2016.  
This brain drain translates to fewer resources to fight tax evasion and corporate frauds, even as CI tackles the vexing variations and growing complexity of identity theft and cybercrimes. New investigations fell 27 percent to 3,853 this year compared with 2013. Tax investigations fell by 32 percent, according to a CI annual report released Wednesday. 
* * * * 
Picking their spots to sow fear and set public examples, CI agents play a central role protecting the integrity of the tax system. Cases often take years of painstaking work to meet the legal threshold of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the intent to cheat on taxes. And with resources stretched, ambitious tax and money-laundering cases risk falling by the wayside. 
“We’re just not going to be able to focus on every type of crime as we shrink,” said Rich Weber, 50, who has run the CI division since 2012. “We’re a nationwide agency, and there’s only so much you can do with 2,000 agents.”
JAT editorial note:  The political travesty now playing out is not the entirely made up claim of White House direct or indirect management of Lerner's unit at the IRS, but the IRS bashing by demagogues.  A revenue gathering agency -- whether called the IRS or something else -- is required for any government -- and even more so for a government such as ours that has a critical role to play both within the U.S. and in the world.  The agency performs an essential function to enforce the laws Congress has enacted in order to fund the necessary functions to make us a better society and to provide essential protection inside and outside the U.S.  Those public servants who perform those functions inside the agency are performing an essential function.  Like other essential government functions (from the military to the IRS), the public servants performing those revenue functions should be appreciated and supported.  But, some politicians have found that IRS bashing plays to a base that does not appreciate and support the IRS.  I just don't believe that is good for the country.

Wednesday, December 2, 2015

In Summons Enforcement Proceeding, Court Rejects Taxpayer's Lack of Possession Defense For Foreign Account Documents (12/2/15)

When the IRS or a grand jury has reason to believe that a taxpayer has a foreign account, it may issue compulsory process for the account documents.  The compulsory process will be an IRS summons or a grand jury subpoena.  As I have discussed earlier in this blog, many taxpayers have unsuccessfully asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege (via act of production).  The Courts have held that the required records doctrine overcomes the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

In United States v. Malhas, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151990 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2015), here, the taxpayer attempted another tack -- the lack of possession defense.  In summary, the defense is that the a party subject to compulsory process cannot produce documents that he does not possess or, if he doesn't possess, have sufficient control over that he could possess the documents.  In Malhas, a summons enforcement proceeding, the Court ruled that, once the IRS has proved it likely that the taxpayer does have the possession or control, the summons can be enforced.

Some interesting features of the opinion are:

1.  "Malhas argued that his control over the bank account at issue [apparently then at UBS] was cancelled on August 3, 2004 when a third party he has never met, Ms. Moosleeithner-Batliner, became an authorized signator and cancelled 'the authorized signatory of Dr. Malhas.'" The opinion does not explain why someone Malhas had never met took over the signatory authority.  Apparently, the Court did not credit this cryptic claim.

2.  "Further, Malhas alleged that the bank transferred all assets from the account at issue [with UBS] to 'Banque Baring Brothers Sturdaza' on September 24, 2008, rendering any attempt to contact 'UBS for account documents . . . useless.'"  The opinion does not indicate how Malhas knew about that transfer if he had nothing to do with the account after 2004.  Apparently, the summons sought records.

3.  Also, the transferee bank -- Banque Baring Brothers Sturdaza -- is one I have not seen surface in the Swiss bank brouhaha.  The US TAX PROGRAM list of Swiss banks participating the U.S. DOJ Swiss Bank Program, here, does list the bank, but assigns no program category to it.  Yet, the timing of the transfer from UBS to Banque Baring Brothers suggests that the bank should perhaps be in the Category 2 program.   In this regard, all category 2 banks have not yet been identified.  The bank's website is here, indicating that the spelling of the last word is "Sturdza."  Googling turns up some interesting stuff, such as the indication in a BloombergBusiness article that it is "Swiss private bank overseeing the wealth of tennis players, soccer stars and other athletes."  See Giles Broom, Baring Swiss Bank for Rich Athletes Buys Asset Manager Coges (BloombergBusiness 2/4/13), here.

4.  Malhas dithered but finally indicated to the Court that, if it would just wait, he "'intend[ed] to issue written requests to both the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) and Banque Baring Brothers Sturdaza to forward to him, with a copy to the IRS, all records, statements and documents regarding any and all non-U.S. accounts, pertaining to Dr. Malhas . . . for the calendar years 2006, 2007, and 2008.'"  Yet, he admitted that "despite being approached by the IRS as early as early 2012 and learning of the November 5 evidentiary hearing on October 8, he had yet to make such contact with the banks at issue."  The Court was not pleased and denied any further time before ruling on the summons enforcement petition, noting "its surprise that Malhas had not previously sought these documents from the banks at issue."

5.  The IRS presented "numerous documents [showing] that Malhas was connected to the banks at issue during the relevant time period."  The court later referred in the quote below to this as a "plethora of documents and records illustrating Malhas's connections with the international banks and the accounts at issue."

6.  In enforcing the summons, the Court has a good discussion of the law relating to the lack of possession defense and the burden on the summonsed party to prove the defense of lack of possession.  Here are the critical paragraphs from the discussion:
A number of Circuit Courts of Appeals have detailed what the taxpayer must show at this hearing to successfully illustrate that he "lacks possession" of the relevant documents. Some have held that it is within the district court's discretion to simply determine whether the facts show that the taxpayer does, or does not, possess the relevant documents. See Barth, 745 F.2d at 187-88 (directing the lower court to "rule explicitly on [the defendant's] defense of nonpossession based on the present record and on any additional evidence the parties may wish to present" and concluding that if the lower court "finds that [the defendant] possesses the [documents], then enforcement may be granted; if [the court] determines that [the defendant] does not possess them, then enforcement should be denied"); see also Gippetti, 153 F. App'x. at 868, citing Barth, 745 F.2d at 187. Others have established the standard in more detail. Specifically, they have stated that, "the party resisting enforcement bears the burden of producing credible evidence that he does not possess or control the documents sought." United States v. Billie, 611 Fed. App'x. 608, 610 (11th Cir. 2015), quoting United States v. Huckaby, 776 F.2d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 1985). Importantly, this "credible evidence" standard operates on a sliding scale: the more the government's evidence suggests the defendant possesses the documents at issue, the heavier the defendant's burden to successfully demonstrate that he does not. Id. at 610-11 ("[T]he burden would be heavy in the present circumstances -- [the defendant's] prior production of materials and his title as Custodian of Records strongly suggest he maintains control and possession."). 
Here, Malhas has failed to satisfy his burden regardless of what standard the Court applies. Specifically, Malhas did not present any evidence at the November 5 evidentiary hearing, let alone "credible evidence" that he did not possess the documents at issue. Huckaby, 775 F.2d at 567. As the government noted, the Court has already found that the IRS's petition was valid under Powell, rendering Malhas's eleventh hour argument otherwise, moot. Further, the IRS's plethora of documents and records illustrating Malhas's connections with the international banks and the accounts at issue overshadowed Malhas's cursory references to the signatory and asset-transfer documents. Specifically, the IRS undercut the importance by pointing out Malhas's "password" that enabled him to access the accounts at issue without a signature. Thus, Malhas's utter lack of evidence left him unable to convince the Court that he does not have possession or custody of the documents. Indeed, even Malhas implied just the opposite. In his November 3 emergency motion, Malhas suggested the banks at issue may possess the summonsed documents, admitting that "[i]f the banks produce documents sought by Petitioner in response to Dr. Malhas' request, compliance would presumably no longer be an issue, and enforcement will be moot." (R. 29 at 2.) Similarly, when asked by the Court at the November 4 emergency motion hearing what he expected to receive from the banks, Malhas admitted that he expected the institutions could produce relevant documents that may go toward compliance with the IRS's summons. These admissions cut against any argument that Malhas does not possess the documents, and it certainly does not satisfy his heavy burden at this stage. See Kis, 658 F.2d at 544. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Malhas has failed to meet his heavy burden, and the IRS has presented compelling evidence that he possesses or has custody of the documents and records the IRS seeks. The Court, therefore, orders him to comply with the IRS's summons by January 12, 2016.
5.  The summons enforcement order gives Malhas until January 12, 2016, to comply.  If he pulled out all stops immediately after the order was issued, he may be able to retrieve the summonsed documents.