Thursday, December 17, 2015

Three More Banks Obtain NPAs under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (12/17/15)

On December 17, 2015, DOJ announced here that Bordier & Cie Switzerland (Bordier), PBZ Verwaltungs AG (PBZ) and PostFinance AG  have entered NPAs under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.  The penalties, aggregating $15.397 million are:

Bordier & Cie Switzerland (Bordier)
$7.827 million
Verwaltungs AG (PBZ)
$5.57 million
PostFinance AG
$2 million

Key Excerpts are:
For one account, a U.S. taxpayer-client refused to provide a copy of his passport, despite repeated requests from Bordier, and in 1998, this client signed bank forms with a fake signature to avoid potential recognition.  This accountholder eventually told Bordier that he did not want to declare the account in the United States because he was a lawyer and would be disbarred.  
* * * *  
In a limited number of instances, Bordier actively facilitated the evasion of U.S. taxes and reporting requirements for some of its U.S. accountholders.  For example, Bordier made repeated transfers of undeclared assets under $10,000 to the Montreal bank account of a U.S. taxpayer-client in Canada in order to help the client avoid U.S. tax and reporting obligations and keep the undeclared assets hidden. For one such transfer, the U.S. taxpayer-client requested his “usual order of chocolate” from Bordier in order to institute these transfers.  Bordier was aware that the U.S. taxpayer-client withdrew the amounts in cash: “Telephone [call from U.S. taxpayer-client].  Please transfer US$8,000 to Montreal as usual.  He will pick up the cash. . . .”  In 2002, according to file notes made by the former relationship manager, Bordier transmitted undeclared assets to a U.S. taxpayer-client in a hidden manner (“sous forme cache” in French).  Bordier’s conduct allowed the bank to increase the undeclared U.S. taxpayer assets that it managed, thereby increasing the fees it generated.  
* * * *  
PostFinance has never offered private banking or wealth management services to any of its customers.  Instead, PostFinance engaged in basic consumer retail banking and payment services. U.S. taxpayers resident in Switzerland, as well as U.S.-Swiss dual nationals, may obtain “current” accounts, which are comparable to checking accounts in the United States. Savings accounts, fixed income retirement accounts and credit cards may be obtained only by Swiss residents.  
PostFinance was aware that citizens and resident aliens of the United States had a legal duty to report their assets and income to the IRS and to pay taxes on the basis of all their income, including income earned from accounts that PostFinance maintained on their behalf.  Largely due to its obligations under Swiss law, however, PostFinance nevertheless opened and maintained undeclared accounts belonging to customers who were subject to U.S. tax and were not complying with their U.S. tax obligations.

The banks will be added to the IRS's Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, here.  As indicated in the last quoted paragraph, accountholders in the listed banks joining OVDP after one of their banks are listed will be subject to the 50% penalty in OVDP (provided that they do not opt out, in which case, who knows).

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:
US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
16
4
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
94
69
$757,418,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
132

$4,227,968,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.



Tuesday, December 15, 2015

Three More Banks Obtain NPAs under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (12/15/15)

On December 15, 2015, DOJ announced here that Crédit Agricole (Suisse) SA (CAS), Dreyfus Sons & Co Ltd, Banquiers (Dreyfus), and Baumann & Cie, Banquiers (Baumann) have entered NPAs under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.  The penalties are:

Crédit Agricole (Suisse) SA (CAS)
$99.211 million
Dreyfus Sons & Co Ltd, Banquiers (Dreyfus)
$24.161 million
Baumann & Cie, Banquiers (Baumann)
$7.7 million

Key excerpts are:
Following World War II, Dreyfus created Panama corporations to hold funds for clients.  This practice had its roots in the desire of Jewish clients to protect their assets for reasons of personal safety, and the purpose and operation of the entities was to conceal ownership of the assets from all government authorities, “friendly” or otherwise.  However, the practice extended well into the 2000s.  Among the Panama entity accounts created by Dreyfus are 33 U.S.-related accounts, the oldest of which opened in 1951. 
 The combined high value of these accounts was approximately $90 million.  The U.S. person beneficial owners of the Panama entity accounts were properly identified as beneficial owners of the entities on Forms A pursuant to Swiss know your customer rules.  However, the entities were identified as the beneficial owner on IRS Forms W-8BEN, when, as Dreyfus well knew, the true beneficial owners were U.S. persons.  Dreyfus employees – primarily the Deputy Chairman of the Executive Management, a former member of Dreyfus’s Board of Directors and Head of the Gérance division, which provides services mainly to corporate entities, and a former deputy manager – also served as corporate directors of the entities.  
With respect to at least two Panama entity accounts, the entity structure was used to conceal payments into the United States.  For example, one Panama entity account was opened in 1991 with a husband and wife, both U.S. nationals living in the United States, as beneficial owners.  The account, which had a high value of over $1 million during the period since Aug. 1, 2008, was opened with funds inherited from a relative with an account at Dreyfus.  Beginning in 2008, checks in amounts between $4,000 and $5,000 each were sent to the husband and the couple’s three sons in the United States on a regular basis.  In total, 205 checks with a combined value of approximately $925,000 were sent to the individual family members in the United States.  Dreyfus’s efforts to convince the beneficial owners to disclose the account were unsuccessful, and the account was closed in 2012 without being disclosed to U.S. authorities. 
For four Panama entity accounts, Dreyfus allowed the accounts to be closed in the form of bearer shares, which assisted in the further concealment of assets in the accounts.  A bearer share is a security that is not required to be registered and which can be transferred without an endorsement of any kind.  Thus, a bearer share is negotiable by whoever possesses it.  For example, an individual can purchase shares from an issuer and exchange the shares for cash at a financial institution that redeems bearer shares or may give the shares to another individual, who may exchange the shares for cash.  The four Panama entities used assets in the accounts to purchase bearer shares at Dreyfus, with the shares then physically delivered to representatives of the Panama entities in closure of the accounts.  Because the shares could then be delivered to the U.S. persons whose assets were converted to bearer shares, or to anyone else, funds from these accounts left Dreyfus in a virtually untraceable manner.  With respect to these four accounts, over $4 million in assets left Dreyfus in the form of bearer shares.    
* * * *
The majority of Baumann’s U.S. clients structured their accounts so that they appeared as if they were held by a non-U.S. legal structure, such as an offshore corporation or trust, which aided and abetted the clients’ ability to conceal their undeclared accounts from the IRS. Baumann was not involved in setting up these entities, but those entities were generally created or serviced by a few Zurich-based lawyers with whom the relationship managers in Baumann’s Zurich branch were personally acquainted. In the period since Aug. 1, 2008, Baumann opened U.S.-related accounts for non-U.S. structures, such as offshore corporations or trusts.  These offshore entities included British Virgin Islands, British West Indies, Panama and Seychelles corporations, as well as Liechtenstein foundations, all of which were established by external law firms. 
As one example, Baumann opened an account in June 2009 for a Panama corporation, established in 2000, where the beneficial owner as listed on Form A was a U.S. citizen domiciled in the United States.  This person was a retired lawyer living in Las Vegas.  The beneficial owner provided a U.S. passport upon opening the account, which was funded by $27 million from the accountholder’s account at another bank.  The accountholder signed Baumann’s compliance form indicating that the Panama corporation was in fact the beneficial owner of the assets for U.S. tax withholding purposes when Baumann knew or should have known this was untrue. 
Baumann offered a variety of other traditional Swiss banking services that, although available to all its clients, it knew could assist, and did assist, its U.S. clients in concealing their undeclared assets and income.  Among other things, Baumann opened numbered accounts and held bank statements and other mail relating to some U.S.-related accounts at Baumann’s offices in Switzerland, rather than sending the statements and mail to the U.S. taxpayers in the United States.  
Regarding one numbered account, in July 2010, the clients transferred $2 million to an account at Baumann from an account at Credit Suisse.  The taxpayers were American horse breeders who had granted a power of attorney to an external asset management company based in Zurich.  That external asset manager introduced the clients to Baumann, and Baumann was instructed to retain the correspondence, to send copies to the clients’ external asset manager and not to invest in U.S. securities.  In 2010 and 2011, Baumann was instructed to make repeated payments of under $10,000 to a U.S. bank account in the name of a U.S.-based coin dealer.  From June to August 2011, the clients instructed Baumann to buy 2,279 pieces of Krugerrand gold coins, at that time worth approximately $3.7 million.  In September 2011, the clients instructed Baumann to close the account.  The remaining assets were withdrawn in cash, and the account closed in 2011.
The banks will be added to the IRS's Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, here.  As indicated in the last quoted paragraph, accountholders in the listed banks joining OVDP after one of their banks are listed will be subject to the 50% penalty in OVDP (provided that they do not opt out, in which case, who knows).

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
16
4
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
93
66
$742,021,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
131

$4,212,571,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.




Addendum 12/16/15 9:45am:

A TNT article today emphasizes the importance of U.S. taxpayer disclosures of the accounts in reducing the penalty amount. Nathan J. Richman & Tom Kasprzak, DOJ Gets 2 More Substantial Swiss Bank Penalties, 2015 TNT 241-6 (12/16/15):
Further, the CAS and Dreyfus NPAs illustrate the importance of account disclosure for determining the penalty amount. Both CAS and Dreyfus had over 850 U.S.-related accounts (954 for CAS and 855 for Dreyfus) and approximately $1.8 billion each in U.S.-related account assets under management, and yet CAS paid four times as large a penalty. (Prior coverage 2015 TNT 109-5: News Stories.)
As readers will recall, the Category 2 penalty base does not include amounts that were either originally disclosed or disclosed pursuant to the IRS's offshore programs.  One would infer that CAS was less successful than Dreyfus in encouraging its depositors to submit to CAS proof that they had disclosed (if they had disclosed).  One would also infer that those taxpayers consisted of some that had disclosed and did not submit proof of disclosure and taxpayers who had not disclosed.  The latter group is almost certainly at some risk of further IRS and DOJ interest.

Status of the NPAs and DOJ/IRS Mining of the Fruits of the NPAs (12/15/15)

Tax Notes Today reported that, at the ABA Criminal Tax Fraud and Tax Controversy 2015 seminar held in Las Vegas last week, the Acting AAG Tax, Carline Ciraolo, "reiterated her previously stated goal of completing the Swiss bank category 2 NPAs by the end of this month." Nathan J. Richman, Tax Division to Complete Non-Prosecution Agreements by Year-End, 2015 TNT 238-3 (12/11/15).  She reported that, as of that date, 61 category 2 NPAs had been entered and 1 NPA patterned on the category 2 NPAs had been entered with a non-bank, Finacor SA.  So, as I derive it, if the previously stated expectation of around 80 completed NPAs still holds, meeting the goal would mean that about 18 need to be entered between now and year end.  Of course, I would presume that the negotiation and drafting of the remaining NPAs is pretty far along, so that hopefully the holiday season for the parties involved will not be too disrupted just to meet what may be an arbitrary deadline of year end 2015.

She also said that the IRS has collected over $600 million from the program.  This is consistent with the numbers I reported after the last disclousre on 12/10/15.

As to the NPAs, she also beat the drum that the IRS and DOJ was obtaining a lot of information that will permit them to chase after tax cheats and enablers criminally and for tax cheats civilly.  As to criminally, the TNT report says:  "Ciraolo said that Swiss bank NPA criminal leads referred to the IRS may have already been developed by the Tax Division and may be accompanied by a request for referral back to the DOJ."  The process, therefore, seems to require a referral from the IRS in order for DOJ to seek indictment.  (That may be reading too much into the cryptic statement as reported, and the reporter may not have gotten it exactly right.)  I think -- no authority -- that prosecution would require the referral from the IRS.  The interesting issue would be if DOJ referred to the IRS with a request that the IRS refer back to DOJ with a prosecution recommendation, but the IRS determined for reasons based on its own assessment of the case and its systemic priorities not to make a prosecution recommendation.  For example, say that the IRS believed that the taxpayer had substantially complied with its voluntary disclosure program but DOJ was requesting a prosecution recommendation anyway (since DOJ says it is not bound by the IRS's voluntary disclosure program).  Could DOJ then prosecute for tax crimes without an IRS referral and recommendation?  I have been interested in this issue for a long time but have never been able to get a clear answer.  I do know that, in the KPMG grand jury investigation, when we had the initial contact for a DOJ conference, the DOJ attorney insisted that the prosecution recommendation that was on the table for the DOJ conference came from the IRS and not from the grand jury prosecutors.  And I subsequently heard (hearsay) that an IRS official who had been assigned to assist the grand jury actually made the decision as to who among the targets or subjects of the grand jury investigation would actually be prosecuted (meaning, I suppose, who would be referred to DOJ for prosecution).  I would think that the IRS recommendation for prosecution would be required in all tax prosecutions, at least where the gravamen of the misconduct is principally tax crimes.  If anyone has any thoughts or learning on this issue, please let me know.

Sunday, December 13, 2015

Sumner Redstone Owes the Gift Tax from 1972 But Not the Civil Fraud or Negligence Penalties (12/13/15)

In Redstone v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-237, here, Sumner Redstone was found liable for "a gift tax deficiency of $737,625 for the calendar quarter ending September 30, 1972."  That's right 1972.  The interest alone on that deficiency will be several, perhaps many times the principal amount of the tax.  (But astute readers will know that Sumner Redstone, a media mogul (see Wikipedia entry here), can pay all of it with little difficulty.)  That was the bad news for Mr. Redstone.  The good news is that the Tax Court relieved him from the civil fraud penalty (then 50%) and the accuracy related penalty (then 5%).  (I am not sure if, for the period in question, these civil penalties drew interest from the due date of the return as they do now.)  The disposition of the penalty issues makes the case interesting, for the determination of the substantive gift tax liability seemed to be relative straight-forward despite the passage of time since 1972.

I will refer to the players involved in the drama by their first names to distinguish them.  The father was Michael "Mickey" Redstone.  I'll call him Mickey, as does the Court.  There were two sons relevant here -- Edward and Sumner.  This opinion does not say a whole lot about Edward's education and experience, but it does say some things about Sumner's because, presumably, that is relevant to what he knew or should have known about the substantive tax liability back in 1972 and hence liability for the penalties.  The Court says cryptically:
Sumner graduated from Harvard College in 1944 and Harvard Law School in 1947. He practiced law for several years, including a stint in the Tax Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, before starting work in 1954 for the family business.
The Wikipedia entry fleshes this out just a bit:
After completing law school, Redstone served as special assistant to U.S. Attorney General Tom C. Clark (who later served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1949 to 1967)[3] and then worked for the United States Department of Justice Tax Division in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco, and thereafter entered private practice. 
From just these bare facts, one might surmise that Sumner was familiar with the tax law and the basic tax concepts that the Tax Court applied to determine that, on the facts, Sumner was liable for the gift tax in question.  One of those concepts is surely that transfers of value with a donative intent is a gift, potentially subject to gift reporting and tax.  But, Sumner pleaded ignorance -- certainly lack of intent in avoiding the civil fraud and negligence penalties.  Not only did he not have an intent to evade his tax liability, but he also was not negligent because he relied on this tax advisers and a memorandum from one tax adviser, which Sumner could not produce.

Well, let's get into the fact to set this up.  At some point, after Sumner left the practice of law to join the family business, the three created a corporation in which the three of them were nominal equal shareholders - 100 shares each.  The father contributed to that corporation disproportionately to the two sons, contributing almost 48%, with each son contributing around 26%.  (OK, there might have been a gift at that time from Mickey to the two sons or at least to someone; read on.)

Sometime later, Mickey created a trust for the grandchildren and contributed 50 shares of his 100 shares of common stock to the trust.  Mickey filed appropriate gift tax returns.  Mickey, then did what looks like an estate freeze recapitalization of his remaining 50 shares of common stock, so that, after the recapitalization, Mickey owned only preferred stock and there were 250 shares of common stock -- 50 owned by the grandchildren's trust and 100 each owned by the two sons.

Then, around 1971, Edward decided he wanted out, and would just take his 100 shares (which Mickey had not yet formally delivered to him), and either be bought out or sell them outside the family.  There followed some contentious negotiations leading to equally contentious litigation.  In the litigation, Mickey (who seemed to have been a strong patriarch used to getting his way), argued that, in effect, his disproportionate original contribution had been made with the understanding that some portion of the stock the sons received was held for the grandchildren, so that Edward was not the true beneficial owner of all of the 100 shares he nominally owned.  The parties settled in a document declaring that Edward owned 2/3 of the 100 shares nominally in his name and the other 1/3 had, since the inception of Edward's nominal ownership, been held "for the benefit of his children * * * in trust and not as beneficial owner."  The settlement agreement then resolved Edward's ownership of the 2/3's he was declared to own by buying out those shares.  The settlement agreement finally required Edward to put the other 1/3 he nominally owned into a trust for Edward's grandchildren.

Of course, the construct recited in the settlement with Edward was that the beneficial ownership of the 1/3 put into trust was never in Edward.  Edward had hotly contested that issue in the litigation, and it is not at all clear to that Edward's settlement of that issue by conferring the benefit in question (that 1/3 of the stock) upon the natural objects of his bounty did not have some donative aspect from Edward.  Nevertheless in an earlier proceeding, the Tax Court held that, because of the contentious posture of the negotiations and settlement, Edward did not have the required donative intent.  Estate of Redstone v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. __ (Oct. 26, 2015). here.

Shortly after this settlement, Sumner put his shares in trusts for his children.  It is that transfer that gave rise to the tax liability here, for Edward filed no gift tax return and did not pay any gift tax with respect to those transfers.  The Court said:
Sumner's transfers of NAI stock to the Brent and Shari Trusts were voluntary. Each transfer was motivated by donative intent toward the natural objects of Sumner's affection. By creating these trusts and transferring 33 1/3 shares of NAI stock to them, Sumner made a gesture of goodwill toward his father, who desired to ensure the financial security of his four grandchildren on equal terms. However, Sumner was not required to take these actions by the Settlement Agreement that resolved Edward's lawsuits. The only obligation that the Settlement Agreement imposed on Sumner was the requirement that he execute certain releases in consideration of mutual releases executed by the other contracting parties. 
The Brent and Shari Trusts, like the Ruth Ann and Michael Trusts, recite that the stock transferred to them had been held "under an oral trust" since 1959. Petitioner presented no evidence that any "oral trust" actually existed whereby Edward or Sumner held in trust for his children a portion of the NAI shares initially registered in his name. Rather, the concept of an "oral trust" developed later and was agreed upon as a mechanism for settling Edward's litigation and implementing Mickey's desire to ensure the financial security of Edward's children.
Notwithstanding Sumner's understanding that there was no oral trust, he incorporated that statement into the trust agreement, although the precise reason he did so is not stated except that Sumner desired to appease his father.  Sumner's tax advisers then advised Sumner that there was no gift tax liability, and one apparently issued a letter or memorandum, now unavailable, to that effect. The Tax Court opinion says that the tax advisers were familiar with the litigation with Edward, but the opinion does not say that Sumner advised the tax advisers that the "oral trust" recitation was not consistent with his understanding of the facts.  Nevertheless, as I will note, the Court found that Sumner had reasonably relied at the time on the advice of his tax advisers.  On this basis, Sumner filed no gift tax return.

In subsequent litigation regarding subsequent events, Sumner gave deposition and trial testimony.  The Court discusses that testimony as follows:
In deposition and at trial of the O'Connor case, Sumner testified that he had transferred the 33 1/3 shares of NAI stock to the Brent and Shari Trusts voluntarily. At his deposition, he explained that he "voluntarily went through the same procedure" as his brother and "gave * * * [his] own children" the stock. While it was Mickey's position "that at least 50 percent" of Edward's shares were held for Edward's children, Sumner testified that Mickey had never expressed the same reservation regarding Sumner's own shares. He continued: "I voluntarily set up an arrangement -- call it what you will -- where my own children would get a third of the stock. * * * I wanted to do the same thing that my brother did, only he did it as a result of litigation. I did it voluntarily." 
At trial in the O'Connor case Sumner maintained the same position: "Nobody sued me. I gave my kids a third of the stock voluntarily, not as the result of a lawsuit. In [s]o doing, I did what I wanted and appeased my father too." He testified that "[t]here was a big difference between Eddie's position and mine" because Edward "was resisting doing what my father wanted," whereas Sumner was simply trying to maintain good family relations. He later testified to the same effect: "Eddie was sued. I was not. And Eddie had to find a justification for what he was doing in transferring. I wasn't sued. I just made an outright gift."
During 1974, for events arising from the Watergate investigation and at the encouragement of a Senate select committee, the IRS looked into certain political contributions that might constitute gifts that were not reported by the contributors.  Sumner, among others, had made contributions.  The IRS sent a letter to Sumner inquiring into the contributions.  Sumner responded.  The IRS then concluded that there was no reason to solicit a gift tax return for 1972.

Apparently, as a result of the later litigation noted above in which Sumner testified about the earlier events, the IRS started an investigation, including for the potential for gift tax in 1972.  The IRS made information and document requests.  Sumner responded, but never complained that the then current investigation violated the prohibition against second examinations in § 7605(b).

Okay, I think the foregoing fairly states the facts as found by the Tax Court.

So, to summarize the Court's holdings:

1. Statute of Limitations was Open and Not Closed by Laches. The Court applied the literal language of § 6501(c)(3) keeping the statute open if a required return has not been filed.  The Court rejected the application of the equitable doctrine of laches, which may, in some contexts, bar a claim where the claimant has not asserted the claim in some reasonable amount of time.  Laches does not apply to this claim, which by statute is clearly timely.

2.  Prohibited Second Examination.  The Tax Court held that, although it is not clear that the first letter inquiring about political contributions was an examination for purposes of the prohibition, even if it was and the subsequent audit out of which the case arose, was a prohibited second examination, it is not clear that dismissal of the case would be the appropriate remedy, but that, in any event, Sumner had waived the argument by not raising it timely.

3.  Gift Tax Due.  The Court applied straight-forward legal concepts to resolve the substantive liability.  The Court held that the transfer was based on Sumner's contemporaneous donative intent and not based upon any oral trust, which did not exist.  The Court distinguished its earlier holding that Edward's transfer to a parallel transfer to his children had not been a gift because the Court, in Edward's case, found the absence of the require donative intent but instead an arm's length resolution of competing positions.  Sumner's case was different. Sumner was not at odds with Mickey and settled his children's trust from donative intentions, which the Tax Court found expressly.

4.  Penalties.  The Court held that the IRS had failed to prove civil fraud by clear and  convincing evidence.  Indeed, the Court found that Sumner had reasonably relied upon his tax adviser, which would preclude the negligence penalty and, of course, would necessarily preclude the civil fraud penalty.

Regarding the civil fraud penalty, the Court reasoned as follows:
Respondent has not met his burden of proof. The oral trust may have been a fiction, but it was a fiction with real-world consequences. Mickey passionately believed in the "oral trust" theory and, at his insistence, it became a central feature of the Settlement Agreement by which Edward's litigation was resolved. To please his father, Sumner adopted the same "oral trust" terminology when making a symmetrical transfer to his own children. There is no evidence that Sumner embraced the "oral trust" concept in an effort to evade his Federal gift tax liabilities.
Regarding the negligence penalty, the Court reasoned as follows:
We find that petitioner made the requisite showing of a reasonable cause defense for both additions to tax. Mr. Rosen, Mr. Isenberg, and the tax professionals at J.K. Lasser were competent tax advisers. Collectively, they advised Sumner about his gift tax filing requirements on 34 occasions beginning in 1970. Sumner sought and received their advice concerning the tax consequences of transferring stock to the Brent and Shari Trusts. The evidence established that Mr. Rosen obtained advice from J.K. Lasser's national office about this transaction; that this advice was memorialized in a letter or memorandum concluding that no gift tax return was required to be filed; that Messrs. Rosen and Isenberg concurred in this conclusion; and that Sumner relied on this advice in good faith. We conclude that petitioner is not liable for an addition to tax for negligence or for failure to file a gift tax return.
One thing that I found peculiar about the penalties discussion is that the facts do not make it clear that Sumner gave his advisers all of the information he knew.  Specifically, and critically, the Court does not find that Sumner advised his tax advisers that his intention at the time, as the Tax Court specifically found, was donative in nature and that there had never been an oral trust.  I would have thought that any competent tax adviser armed with those two key facts would have had a hard time concluding that there was no gift tax.  And, failure to advise would almost certainly require application of the negligence penalty and, if intentional, the civil fraud penalty.  Obviously, the IRS failed to prove that Sumner intended fraud, so civil fraud is clearly out.  But, negligence for a person of Sumner's business and tax acumen?  The Tax Court opinion is not convincing.  However, it is likely that the Court ultimately relied on Sumner's testimony (not clear whether in this case or the earlier litigation).  The Court says:
Sumner testified that Mr. Rosen "would have made the determination" whether a gift tax return was required to be filed. "If there were a gift tax due and gift tax return, it would have been filed. If there was a gift tax * * * due, it would have been paid." Consistently with that previous testimony, Sumner testified in the instant case that he had relied on his accountants and lawyers to determine whether gift tax had to be paid in 1972 and "[t]hey apparently concluded that there was no tax due."

Thursday, December 10, 2015

Two More Banks Obtain NPAs under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (12/10/15)

On December 10, 2015, DOJ announced here that Cornèr Banca SA (Cornèr) and Bank Coop AG (Bank Coop) have entered NPAs under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.  The penalties are:

Cornèr Banca SA (Cornèr)
$5.068 million
Bank Coop AG (Bank Coop)
$3.223 million

The banks will be added to the IRS's Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, here.  As indicated in the last quoted paragraph, accountholders in the listed banks joining OVDP after one of their banks are listed will be subject to the 50% penalty in OVDP (provided that they do not opt out, in which case, who knows).

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
16
4
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
91
63
$610,949,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
129

$4,081,499,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.



Tuesday, December 8, 2015

One More Bank Obtains NPA under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (12/8/15)

On November 24, 2015, DOJ announced here that the following Swiss bank entered an NPA under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.

Aargauische Kantonalbank (AKB) 
$1.983 million

The bank will be added to the IRS's Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, here.  As indicated in the last quoted paragraph, accountholders in the listed banks joining OVDP after one of their banks are listed will be subject to the 50% penalty in OVDP (provided that they do not opt out, in which case, who knows).

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
16
4
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
91
61
$602,658,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
129

$4,073,208,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.





Monday, December 7, 2015

New Transportation Bill, FAST, Adds Some Tax Provisions (12/7/15; 2/27/16)

This blog entry was substantially revised on 2/27/16 to incorporate the revisions I just made to my Federal Tax Procedure text:
XIII. Denial or Revocation of Passport for Seriously Delinquent Tax Debt.. 
Section 7345(a) [here] and 22 U.S.C. § 2714a [here], added in late 2015, require that, upon the IRS certification transmitted to the Secretary of State (through the Secretary of the Treasury) an individual has “a seriously delinquent tax debt,” the Secretary of State “shall not issue a passport” to the individual and, if a passport has already been issued, "may revoke" the individual's passport. n2234   A “seriously delinquent tax debt” is an assessed tax debt greater than $50,000 if a notice of  tax lien has been filed with CDP rights exhausted or lapsed or a levy under § 6331 has been made. n2235  Exceptions are made for debts for debts that are being paid “in a timely manner” pursuant to agreement with the IRS or which are subject to either a CDP hearing or an election for innocent spouse relief under § 6015. n2236 The IRS must “contemporaneously notify an individual of any certification under subsection (a).” n2237 The notice shall include notice of the certification and of the right to bring a civil action in the district court or Tax Court to contest whether the certification was erroneous. n2238  The certification must be reversed if the certification was erroneous, the tax debt is fully satisfied or the tax debt ceases to be a seriously delinquent tax debt as defined. n2239  The required notices of tax liens and notices of levy must include notice of § 6345's authority to deny or revoke passports. n2240 The Secretary of State may approve exceptions to these requirements in “emergency circumstances” or for “humanitarian reasons” n2241 or may limit the passport only for return to the U.S. n2242  Finally, apart from a seriously delinquent tax debt certification, the Secretary of State may deny a passport for failure to provide a valid Social Security Number. n2243.
   n2234 § 7345(a); and 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(e)(1).
   n2235 § 7345(b)(1). Like many of provisions of the Code, the amount is adjusted for inflation.  § 6345(f).
   n2236 § 7345(b)(2).
   n2237 § 7345(d).
   n2238 § 7345(e).
   n2239 § 7345(c)(1) (reversal of certification if error or debt paid or ceases to be a seriously delinquent tax debt) &(e)(2) (judicial determination of erroneous certification); 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(g).
   n2240 FAST Act § 32101(b), amending § 6320(a)(3) and § 6331(d)(4) to add this requirement.
   n2241 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(e)(1)(B) & (f)(1)(B).
   n2242 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(f)(2)(B). n2243 22 U.S.C. § 2714a(f)(1).

Other Provisions of FAST ACT

The other provisions of the bill are important but probably not of much interest to the readers of this blog.  The renewal of outsourcing of debt collection to private debt services is, I think, odd but not unexpected in today's political environment.  Without getting into the details, it seems to apply only to those debts which, from a collection perspective, are delinquent in the collection cycle and thus would require major IRS resources to collect.  For those debts, perhaps, it may make sense to permit some private debt collectors -- acting under proper safeguards spelled out in the statute -- expend their own resources to chase after the debts.  For more comment on the new provision, see Robert M. Wood, IRS Private Debt Collectors Are Now Legal: 10 Things You Should Know (Forbes 12/1/15), here.