Wednesday, November 25, 2015

One More Bank Obtains NPA under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (11/25/15)

On November 24, 2015, DOJ announced here that the following Swiss banks have entered NPAs under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.

IHAG Zürich AG (IHAG)
$7.453 million

One interesting excerpt from the press release:
In a few instances, IHAG assisted certain recalcitrant U.S. persons in further concealing undisclosed accounts by moving the funds to another jurisdiction and returning the funds to IHAG in a different name in order to conceal the U.S. persons’ ownership of the assets and enable the recalcitrant accountholders to continue to maintain undeclared accounts at IHAG.  For example, a family of U.S. persons held assets at IHAG in the name of a Liechtenstein foundation, and another unrelated U.S. person held funds in the name of a Panama foundation.  These foundation structures were designed to conceal the true beneficial ownership of the assets.  In the case of the Panama foundation, IHAG assisted the U.S. person in creating the foundation.  The value of the assets in the two accounts together totaled approximately $63 million. 
To assist these U.S. clients in further concealing their assets and evading U.S. taxes, in order to maintain these recalcitrant individuals as IHAG clients, IHAG personnel – with the assistance of an unaffiliated fiduciary services firm in Zurich and with the knowledge and approval of bank management – moved assets from the two foundation accounts to an unaffiliated bank in Hong Kong. The funds then returned to IHAG under the name of a Singapore entity wholly owned by IHAG’s parent company, IHAG Holding, so that the accounts would bear no trace of the U.S. persons’ beneficial interest in the assets held in the accounts.  The multi-step scheme also involved an entity in Hong Kong in which IHAG Holding owned a minority interest. 
This scheme enabled the assets to be stripped of any indicia of U.S. ownership.  In effectuating this scheme, IHAG took advantage of Swiss law, which allowed IHAG in these circumstances to treat the accounts as if know-your-customer review of the accounts had occurred in Singapore.  Accordingly, IHAG did not apply Swiss know-your-customer requirements when the accounts returned to IHAG under a different name.  IHAG’s files for the accounts deliberately did not contain any documentation of the U.S. persons’ interest in the assets in the accounts.  IHAG knowingly and willfully committed tax fraud with respect to those accounts.  
In a few other instances, IHAG assisted clients in establishing foundations used to hold their assets at IHAG.  The U.S. persons who were the beneficial owners of the foundation accounts were properly identified as beneficial owners of the foundations on certain forms pursuant to Swiss know-your-customer rules.  However, the foundations were identified as the beneficial owner on IRS Forms W-8BEN, thereby masking the true beneficial ownership of the accounts by U.S. persons. 
Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
17
5
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
90
58
$570,687,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
129

$4,041,237,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.







One More Bank Obtains NPA under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (11/25/15)

On November 24, 2015, DOJ announced here that the following Swiss banks have entered NPAs under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.

Deutsche Bank (Suisse) SA (Deutsche Bank Suisse)
$31.026 million

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
17
5
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
89
57
$563,234,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
128

$4,033,784,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.



Saturday, November 21, 2015

Fifth Circuit Sustains Convictions Despite Trial Judge's Refusal to Give Proper Cheek Willfulness Instruction (11/21/15; 11/22/15)

In United States v. Carter, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20240 (5th Cir. 11/19/15), unpublished, here, the defendant, Carter, was a tax preparer convicted of "five counts of willfully aiding and assisting in the preparation of fraudulent tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) [here]."  As alleged and the Court of Appeals believed proved at trial, Carter offered certain of his clients deductions for African art supposedly purchased after the year the deduction was claimed, with the required appraisals backdated.  Carter was indicted for conspiracy to aid and assist and for the substantive offense of aiding and assisting.  Carter had requested the following instruction:
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant acted willfully. A defendant does not act willfully if he believes in good faith that his actions comply with the law. Therefore, if the Defendant believed that what he was doing was in accord with the tax statutes, he cannot be said to have acted with criminal intent. Therefore, if you find that the Defendant honestly believed that he was not violating the tax laws, even if that belief was unreasonable or irrational, then you should find him not guilty. However, you may consider whether the Defendant's belief was actually reasonable as a factor in deciding whether he held that good faith belief. 
The burden of establishing lack of good faith and criminal intent rests upon the prosecution. A defendant is under no burden to prove his good faith; rather, the prosecution must prove bad faith beyond a reasonable doubt.
According to the Fifth Circuit opinion:
The Government objected to the instruction on the grounds that the second paragraph was an incorrect statement of law. During a pretrial conference, defense counsel admitted that the Government's objection was meritorious but maintained that the remainder of the instruction [the first paragraph] was correct.
Immediately before instructing the jury, Carter's "Counsel averred that, under Cheek, 'if the defendant ultimately believed that he was not violating any tax laws, even if that belief is unreasonable or irrational, then you should find him not guilty.'"

The trial court gave the following instruction instead of the one requested:
Carter's acts in connection with income tax returns are not willful if they are done through inadvertence, carelessness, justified excuse, or honest misunderstanding of the law. 
The defendant is not guilty of willfully preparing a false or fraudulent return if he in good faith believes that the return, as he prepared it, truthfully reports the client's income-tax information. Even if the income was understated or the deductions or credits were overstated, he is not guilty unless he knew the return to be false and authorized its filing with the intent to violate the law.
On appeal, the Government conceded that the Court erred in not giving the Cheek instruction that a belief of legality, even if unreasonable, defeats the willfulness required to convict for tax crimes requiring that the defendant act willfully.

Despite the error, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions:
Carter's sole argument on appeal is that the district court committed reversible error by failing to include in its willfulness instruction to the jury "that a good faith belief may be objectively unreasonable if sincerely held." In view of the Government's concession that the district court committed error, we simply review for harmless error. Thus, the salient question before us is whether, "in light of the entire record, the challenged instruction could not have affected the outcome of the case." United States v. Demmitt, 706 F.3d 665, 675 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 2007) (same).
The Court of Appeals recounts in great detail the evidence at trial in concluding that the jury would have determined willfulness if properly instructed and affirms on that basis.

JAT Comment:  I am surprised that the attorneys, particularly the Government attorney, would not have attempted at trial to correct the judge so that the jury was properly instructed.  Obviously Carter's counsel did, but the opinion is silent as to whether Government counsel made the attempt to correct the judge.  The Cheek holding is the bedrock of the Title 26 tax crimes and known -- or should be known -- to every attorney practicing in the area. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1990).

Equally troubling is that the Court may have taken over the province of the jury in holding that the jury would have returned the same verdict with the proper instruction.  I think that conclusion is likely on the evidence recounted  by the Court of Appeals, but being likely does not mean that the jury's role in making the find should be short-circuited.  In establishing the Cheek standard , the Supreme Court made no examination of the record to conclude whether the jury would have convicted Cheek even with the proper instruction.  To be sure, the cases articulate the proposition that improper instructions will not require reversal of a conviction is the evidence is so overwhelming that conviction would be a certainty.  The Court cites United States v. Montgomery, 747 F.3d 303, 310 (5th Cir. 2014); see Good Opinion on Error in Not Giving Requested Good Faith Belief Instructions (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 3/29/14), here.  But, I think that it should be the unusual case where the issue is willfulness.  Otherwise, this is an open invitation for trial courts just to give the standard willfulness instruction without the good faith belief nuance.  See my blog just cited where I note that a defendant should be entitled to the instruction if he reasonably put good faith in play.  See also  Michael Saltzman and Leslie Book, IRS Practice and Procedure (Thomsen Reuters 2015), here, at ¶ 12.05[2][b] Willfulness and Good Faith, noting (footnote omitted):
The next question is whether, when there is a record predicate for the good-faith defense, the trial court's refusal to give the separate good-faith instruction is reversible error. Courts of Appeals are reluctant to reverse because, they reason, the Cheek willfulness instructions will advise the jury that the defendant must violate a known legal duty and if the defendant acted in good faith (certainly as to whether or not he or she had a known legal duty), then the jury would know willfulness could not exist. Hence, these courts reason, it is not reversible error for the trial judge to decline to give a separate good faith defense instruction. This holding is not that the good-faith defense instruction may not be given if a proper foundation is laid; it is just that there is no reversible error if a proper good-faith defense instruction is not given. But we believe most judges will give the instruction with the proper foundation.
[Note: I was the principal draftsman of the Chapter from which this is quoted.]

I am not convinced on the evidence recounted by the Court of Appeals that the jury would have convicted, particularly since the jury did acquit the defendant of tax offense conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, here, to aid in the preparation of false tax returns.  As described by the Court of Appeals, the conspiracy charged was an offense conspiracy which requires the same level of willfulness as the offense that was the object of the conspiracy.  See my article John A. Townsend, Tax Obstruction Crimes: Is Making the IRS's Job Harder Enough, 9 Hous. Bus. & Tax. L.J. 255, 262 n.40 & 264 n52 (2009), here, citing Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672 (1959).  On the basis of the erroneous instruction without the Cheek nuance, the jury acquitted of the offense conspiracy.  While there is no requirement that the verdicts be consistent, there seems to be enough here as there was in Cheek to warrant a new trial to let the jury speak based on proper instructions.  Of course, in a new trial with proper instructions, the defendant likely would be convicted as was Cheek.  That seems to be the Court's conclusion, so why bother imposing the systemic costs of a new trial?

Also, Carter's counsel apparently abandoned the request for the second paragraph in the instruction originally requested.  That paragraph would have added:
The burden of establishing lack of good faith and criminal intent rests upon the prosecution. A defendant is under no burden to prove his good faith; rather, the prosecution must prove bad faith beyond a reasonable doubt.
The prosecutor objected that this paragraph was not a good statement of the law and apparently Carter's counsel conceded the point.  It is not clear to me why Carter's counsel abandoned the second paragraph and did not raise it later.  Perhaps as written, the paragraph is not the most articulate for the concept.  But I think the law is that, if the defendant fairly puts his good faith in play (he testified here), the Government has to prove willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt, which requires that it negate good faith beyond a reasonable doubt.  In Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991), the Court said (emphasis supplied):
In such a case, if the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge component of the willfulness requirement. But carrying this burden requires negating a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax laws. This is so because one cannot be aware that the law imposes a duty upon him and yet be ignorant of it, misunderstand the law, or believe that the duty does not exist. In the end, the issue is whether, based on all the evidence, the Government has proved that the defendant was aware of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if the jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding and belief submission, whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable.
In other words, it is necessary that, in proving willfulness, if good faith is reasonably in play on the evidence, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act with good faith.

The above is as revised on 12/22/15.

Three More Banks Obtain NPA under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (11/21/15)

On November 19, 2015, DOJ announced here that the following Swiss banks have entered NPAs under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.

BNP Paribas (Suisse) SA (BNPP)
$59.783 million
KBL (Switzerland) Ltd. (KBL Switzerland)
$18.792 million
Bank CIC
$3.281 million.

The aggregate amount for these banks is $81,856,000.

I thought the following actions required by the program interesting as a reminder that the DOJ Swiss Bank Program covers only the banks and not their personnel and affiliations, such as asset managers (at least the egregious actors among their personnel and affiliations).
KBL Switzerland committed to providing full cooperation to the U.S. government and has made timely and comprehensive disclosures regarding its U.S. cross-border business.  Among other things, KBL Switzerland has described in detail the structure of its cross-border business for U.S.-related accounts including, but not limited to:
  • The policies and lack of oversight that contributed to the misconduct committed by KBL Switzerland relationship managers and their supervisors;
  • Data on desks and employees with elevated concentrations of U.S.-related accounts;
  • Information on key external asset managers that had significant involvement with U.S.-related accounts;
  • The names and positions of compliance officers and senior managers; and
  • Written narratives on its largest and most problematic U.S.-related accounts.
The banks will be added to the IRS's Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, here.  Accountholders in the listed banks joining OVDP after one of their banks are listed will be subject to the 50% penalty in OVDP (provided that they do not opt out, in which case, who knows?).

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
17
5
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
89
56
$532,208,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
128

$4,002,758,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.



New Format for Reporting DOJ Tax Announcements of Swiss Banks Joining the DOJ Swiss Bank Program (11/21/15)

Starting with the announcement of three banks joining the DOJ Swiss Bank Program that I will post shortly after this posting, I will provide more summary reviews of the announcements.  In the past, I had cut and pasted the portions of the press releases explaining the types of actions the banks committed that impelled them to join the program to receive assurance of nonprosecution through NonProseuction Agreements.  Basically, these types of actions are common among these banks, with some immaterial variations in how they were implemented.  Accordingly, I will only provide summary information of the banks and penalties, will provide a link to the DOJ Tax Press Release, and will continue to present the aggregate public data for the program.  If, in reviewing the press releases, I find something I think is particularly interesting, I will cut and paste it only that portion and perhaps comment on it.  But, since, within reasonable tolerances, the game and the actions is the same, I do not expect to do that too often.

A reminder that the press releases have links to the Deferred Prosecution Agreement and Supporting State of Facts.  The press releases, NonProsecution Agreements and Statements of Fact are also available on the DOJ Tax's Web Site titled:  Swiss Bank Program, here.  On that site, the banks are listed in order of the date of the NPA.  Accordingly, for easier reference, I will post periodically a list of the banks in alphabetical order.

Tuesday, November 17, 2015

One More Bank Obtains NPA under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (11/17/15)

On November 17, 2015, DOJ announced here that Maerki Baumann & Co. AG has entered an NPA under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.

The penalty is:

Maerki Baumann & Co. AG
$23.92 million

Here are key excerpts:
According to the terms of the non-prosecution agreement signed today, Maerki Baumann agrees to cooperate in any related criminal or civil proceedings, demonstrate its implementation of controls to stop misconduct involving undeclared U.S. accounts and pay a penalty in return for the department’s agreement not to prosecute this bank for tax-related criminal offenses. 
Maerki Baumann is a family-owned private bank organized under the laws of Switzerland.  It is headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, and has a branch office in Lugano, Switzerland.  In the 1990s, Maerki Baumann developed a relationship with a Swiss referral source that introduced clients to Maerki Baumann primarily from the United States.  This source was affiliated with an insurance company that also deposited with Maerki Baumann pooled assets from its insurance customers.  Maerki Baumann understood that most were U.S. persons.  At some point in the late 1990s or early 2000s, Maerki Baumann also began receiving referrals of U.S. clients from an external asset manager based in the United States.  These referrals included clients with undeclared accounts.  
Although Maerki Baumann had long had U.S. clients, it had no formal U.S. desk or team until 2001, when it consolidated responsibility for U.S. clients into what had been the “Swiss team” and renamed it the “Swiss/U.S. team.”  Maerki Baumann increased its focus on its U.S. cross-border business from 2003 to 2005.  In 2003, Maerki Baumann hired a relationship manager (RM-1) from the U.S./Canada desk at another bank. 
RM-1 introduced Maerki Baumann to another relationship manager (RM-2), with whom RM-1 had previously worked at another bank and who had significant experience servicing U.S. accounts.  Maerki Baumann hired RM-2 in 2005 with the expectation that RM-2 would provide expertise to the U.S. side of Maerki Baumann’s Swiss/U.S. team and actively recruit additional U.S. clients.  By the end of 2005, in addition to the head of the Swiss/U.S. team, the U.S. component of Maerki Baumann’s Swiss/U.S. team consisted of three relationship managers, including RM-1 and RM-2.  The client base of these relationship managers consisted largely of U.S. clients.  Later, these relationship managers were assisted by three junior members of the Swiss/U.S. team.   On approximately 35 occasions, relationship managers traveled to the United States to meet with U.S. clients for the purpose of building and maintaining relationships with these clients. 
Maerki Baumann terminated RM-2’s employment in 2008.  In 2011, RM-2 was charged in a federal court in the United States with conspiring to impede and impair the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the ascertainment, computation, assessment and collection of U.S. income taxes, in connection with RM-2’s activities at a bank other than Maerki Baumann.  
Maerki Baumann opened, maintained and serviced accounts for U.S. persons that it knew or had reason to know were likely not declared as required by U.S. law.  Maerki Baumann also offered a variety of traditional Swiss banking services, including hold mail instructions and numbered accounts, that it knew could assist, and did in fact assist, U.S. clients in the concealment of assets and income from the IRS.  The combination of hold mail instructions and numbered accounts on undeclared accounts significantly reduced the ability of the IRS to learn the identities of the U.S. persons. 
Maerki Baumann also allowed U.S. persons to maintain accounts held in the name of non-operating non-U.S. corporations or other legal entities that were beneficially owned by these U.S. persons.  The jurisdictions in which the entities were incorporated or formed included Liechtenstein, Panama and the British Virgin Islands.  On at least two occasions, relationship managers met directly with the beneficial owners of the Maerki Baumann accounts held by the entities. 
Between 2004 and 2008, on approximately a monthly basis (but sometimes more often), RM-1 received from U.S. clients checks ranging from just under $10,000 to $85,000, which were drawn on U.S. company accounts in California, for deposit into accounts beneficially owned by those U.S. clients or their designees.  The correspondence accompanying the checks stated that the checks were for “materials purchased” and instructed the relationship manager to “process the purchase orders as needed,” and many of the checks themselves bore the notation “see purchase order.”  However, there were no purchase orders attached, and Maerki Baumann was never provided with any purchase orders.  Additionally, RM-1’s notes state that certain checks were for under $10,000 “in order to avoid any unnecessary attention.”  Likewise, with respect to at least two U.S.-related accounts, relationship managers knew between 2003 and 2005 that the client was structuring the transactions to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements.
Relationship managers communicated or discussed communicating with U.S. clients by confidential means.  For example, in October 2006, one relationship manager advised a client that if there was a need for urgent contact, he would send the client a card stating “Greetings from [relationship manager].”  In another instance, in June 2009, a client’s correspondence to a relationship manager stated, “If there are any questions, please phone me on my cell phone or email me with our usual confidentiality.”  In some instances, the accountholders had disclosed to relationship managers that their accounts were undeclared. 
Maerki Baumann and its relationship managers also: 
  • Permitted assets in an account held by a known U.S. person to be transferred in 2006 to a new account held by a life insurance company, known as an “insurance wrapper”; 
  • Processed requests from U.S. taxpayers for cash or precious metal withdrawals, thus not triggering any transaction reporting requirements;
  • Permitted a withdrawal of approximately one million Swiss francs from a U.S. client’s account after the client refused to declare money in the account in the United States;
  • Delivered cash withdrawals to U.S. clients in Switzerland; and
  • Offered credit, debit or travel cash cards, which facilitated the access to or use of undeclared funds on deposit at Maerki Baumann.
By participating in the Swiss Bank Program, Maerki Baumann has committed to cooperate with the U.S. government in its efforts to identify U.S. persons who engaged in tax evasion and/or fraud.  Among other actions, Maerki Baumann has provided full cooperation to allow the United States to be able to request and obtain from Switzerland through the 1996 Convention and the 2009 Protocol, once ratified, the bank files of non-tax compliant U.S. persons.  This will result in the United States receiving files identifying U.S. persons who previously held undeclared accounts at Maerki Baumann, directly or through entities. 
Since Aug. 1, 2008, Maerki Baumann had 571 U.S.-related accounts, comprising maximum assets under management of approximately $790 million, including assets of declared accounts.  Maerki Baumann will pay a penalty of $23.92 million.        
In accordance with the terms of the Swiss Bank Program, Maerki Baumann mitigated its penalty by encouraging U.S. accountholders to come into compliance with their U.S. tax and disclosure obligations.  While U.S. accountholders at Maerki Baumann who have not yet declared their accounts to the IRS may still be eligible to participate in the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, the price of such disclosure has increased. 
Most U.S. taxpayers who enter the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program to resolve undeclared offshore accounts will pay a penalty equal to 27.5 percent of the high value of the accounts.  On Aug. 4, 2014, the IRS increased the penalty to 50 percent if, at the time the taxpayer initiated their disclosure, either a foreign financial institution at which the taxpayer had an account or a facilitator who helped the taxpayer establish or maintain an offshore arrangement had been publicly identified as being under investigation, the recipient of a John Doe summons or cooperating with a government investigation, including the execution of a deferred prosecution agreement or non-prosecution agreement.  With today’s announcement of this non-prosecution agreement, noncompliant U.S. accountholders at Maerki Baumann must now pay that 50 percent penalty to the IRS if they wish to enter the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program.
The bank will be added to the IRS's Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, here.  As indicated in the last quoted paragraph, accountholders in the listed banks joining OVDP after one of their banks are listed will be subject to the 50% penalty in OVDP (provided that they do not opt out, in which case, who knows).

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
17
5
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
87
53
$450,352,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
126

$3,920,902,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.





Monday, November 16, 2015

Is Jury Unanimity Required as to at Least One Obstructive Act for Tax Obstruction? (11/16/15)

It is a truism that jury unanimity is required for the conviction of a crime.  In the Chapter I prepared in Michael Saltzman and Leslie Book, IRS Practice and Procedure (Thomsen Reuters 2015), here, at ¶ 12.03[1][c][vi][A] General conspiracy statute, I ask the following (footnotes omitted):
What does it mean to say that an overt act is required for conviction of a general conspiracy (including a Klein conspiracy)? Certainly, the indictment must plead the overt act element and the jury must find the existence of the element in order to convict. But many indictments merely plead generally the existence of at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, without specifying the overt act itself; the jury then finds in a general guilty verdict that at least one unspecified overt act occurred. Must the indictment be more specific as to the precise overt act or acts alleged to support conviction? Must the jury specifically find and reach unanimity as to one or more overt acts that support the general verdict of conviction? The sparse authority addressing the issue directly seems to support the proposition that the jury need not be unanimous as to any overt act.
In United States v. Molen, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19614 (9th Cir. 2015), unpublished, here, the Ninth Circuit addressed much the same question in the tax obstruction statute, § 7212(a), here.
3. We need not address whether the 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) charge required a specific unanimity instruction because Molen's substantial rights were not violated. See United States v. Pelisamen, 641 F.3d 399, 404 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that, where defendant does not object to jury instructions at trial, relief is unwarranted unless there has been plain error that affects the defendant's substantial rights and the fairness or integrity of the proceedings). The jury's guilty verdict on counts one and two, the § 1521 charges, established a unanimous finding that Molen filed a false lien against IRS officers, one of the obstructive means alleged in the indictment. See United States v. Chen Chian Liu, 631 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, overwhelming evidence demonstrated that Molen filed the lien with an intent to secure an unlawful benefit, satisfying the requirement under § 7212(a) that the obstructive means were undertaken "corruptly." See United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2005).
The tax obstruction statute has been described as a one-person Klein / defraud conspiracy. See CTM 17.02 (2001 ed.) where DOJ Tax asserted that tax obstruction may be charged where the Klein conspiracy is “unavailable due to insufficient evidence of conspiracy,” although that statement is omitted from the 2008 ed.); see also David F. Axelrod, Larry A. Campagna, James A. Bruton III, The “New” Tax Laws - 26 U.S.C. Section 7212(a) and the One-Person Conspiracy (Paper prepared for ABA National Institute on Criminal Tax Fraud in 1999).  So, the learning from the overt act requirement appears relevant.  Keep in mind that the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the issue in Molen was under the stringent plain error standard -- it might have been error if properly and timely raised; it was just not plain error.

I offer the briefs of the parties which develops the issue reasonably well.

  • Molen Opening Brief, here.
  • U.S. Answering Brief, here.
  • Molen Reply Brief, here.

The Government's summary of its argument on the unanimity issue in the answering brief is:
The omission of a unanimity instruction was not plain error because none was required, and there was no legal precedent for such an instruction. Moreover, even if a unanimity instruction was required, neither Molen’s substantive rights, nor the fairness of his trial, was affected because the jury returned a unanimous verdict convicting him (twice) of at least one of the means of violating § 7212(a) (the filing of false liens), and the United States also proved beyond a reasonable doubt the other means alleged in the indictment.
Close to what the Court held.  The details of the argument are fleshed out later in the brief.  The Ninth Circuit obviously accepted the argument.  Consider the following from the detailed argument:
Molen cites no case suggesting that a unanimity instruction is required as to a violation of the IRS obstruction statute, and there is no precedent in this Circuit to suggest that any such instruction is required. A review of model jury instructions related to § 7212(a) reveals a variation among the Circuits who have addressed the issue of whether 7212(a) necessitates a unanimity instruction. See, e.g., Fed. Crim. Jury Instr. 7th Cir. § 7212 (2013 ed.) (listing four elements, but no unanimity requirement); but see Fed. Crim. Jury Instr. 11th Cir. § 7212 (describing two elements, but noting that jurors “must all agree on which method the defendant corruptly used”). Thus, the lack of a unanimity instruction where the trial court correctly instructed the jury to the elements of the violation cannot constitute error that is plain.
The point is, I suppose, that a different result might obtain if the argument is made timely.

This also points up a truism of our geographical federal system that there can be disagreements as to key aspects of the law that affect parties' rights -- here whether unanimity is required as to the obstructive act.  While the substantive offense convictions may have permitted the Ninth Circuit to infer unanimity, that is not the same as having the jury, properly instructed, determine unanimity.

Friday, November 13, 2015

One More Bank Obtains NPA under DOJ Swiss Bank Program (11/13/15)

On November 13, 2015, DOJ announced here that Standard Chartered Bank (Switzerland) SA, en liquidation (SCB Switzerland) has entered an NPA under the DOJ program for Swiss banks, here.

The penalty is:

 Standard Chartered Bank (Switzerland) SA, en liquidation (SCB Switzerland)
$6.337 million

Here are key excerpts:
SCB Switzerland is a private bank with a single office located in Geneva, Switzerland.  It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Chartered PLC, a British multinational banking and financial services company headquartered in London. SCB Switzerland joined the Standard Chartered group of entities (the Standard Chartered Group) in May 2008 when Standard Chartered PLC acquired American Express Bank Ltd. As part of that acquisition, Standard Chartered Group acquired American Express Bank (Switzerland) SA, a private bank incorporated in Switzerland in 1987, which thereafter operated under the name SCB (Switzerland) SA. 
In early 2014, the Standard Chartered Group decided to cease its Swiss private banking operations for commercial reasons. SCB Switzerland is now in voluntary formal liquidation. Subject to Swiss regulatory approval, SCB Switzerland expects to return its banking license at the end of 2015, and then the entity will continue to exist as a corporation in liquidation until at least the end of 2018, without banking status or supervision by Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA and with no operations other than completing the wind down. 
Through its employees and others, SCB Switzerland knew or should have known that some of the U.S. persons who opened or maintained accounts at SCB Switzerland may not have complied with their U.S. income tax and reporting obligations.  By establishing and maintaining such accounts, SCB Switzerland provided assistance to certain U.S. persons in evading their U.S. tax obligations. Among other things, SCB Switzerland:

  • Agreed to hold account statements and other mail relating to some U.S.-related accounts;
  •  Provided account statements and other documentation to the accountholder which contained only the account number in order to further insure the secrecy of the identity of the accountholder; and
  • Agreed to hold account statements and other mail relating to some U.S.-related accounts;
  • Provided account statements and other documentation to the accountholder which contained only the account number in order to further insure the secrecy of the identity of the accountholder; and
  • Accepted and included in its account records Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Forms W-8BEN (or equivalent documents) provided by the directors of the offshore companies that falsely represented that such companies were the beneficial owners of the assets in those accounts for U.S. federal income tax purposes.

SCB Switzerland opened and maintained accounts for certain U.S. persons in the name of structures, including trusts created by American Express and inherited and maintained by affiliates of SCB Switzerland, which served as the nominal accountholders of bank accounts that held assets that, in reality, belonged to U.S. persons.  SCB Switzerland adopted the Advisory Center/Booking Center Model from American Express Bank. This method allowed clients to book and hold accounts in any of Standard Chartered Group’s booking centers, including Geneva, while working with relationship managers at other locations throughout the world. The Group also acquired a trust center from American Express Bank. Trust services were available to eligible clients who wished to set up trusts or private investment companies. The trust centers were located in Guernsey, Singapore and the Cayman Islands. A client could create a trust structure in any one of the trust centers while opening an account in another booking center and working with a relationship manager in another advisory center. 
SCB Switzerland maintained one account held by a British Virgin Islands private investment company, of which the beneficial owner was a U.S. citizen. The beneficial owner had provided SCB Switzerland with a false W-8BEN, and SCB Switzerland was unaware of the U.S. citizenship of the beneficial owner until 2010.  In 2010, a compliance officer discovered the beneficial owner’s U.S. citizenship through a periodic review of the account that included an Internet search.  Nevertheless, SCB Switzerland maintained the account for approximately two years after discovering that the beneficial owner was a U.S. citizen. 
Since Aug. 1, 2008, SCB Switzerland held 22 U.S.-related accounts, comprising a peak of aggregated assets under management of $33.1 million. SCB Switzerland will pay a penalty of $6.337 million. 
In accordance with the terms of the Swiss Bank Program, SCB Switzerland mitigated its penalty by encouraging U.S. accountholders to come into compliance with their U.S. tax and disclosure obligations.  While U.S. accountholders at SCB Switzerland who have not yet declared their accounts to the IRS may still be eligible to participate in the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, the price of such disclosure has increased. 
Most U.S. taxpayers who enter the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program to resolve undeclared offshore accounts will pay a penalty equal to 27.5 percent of the high value of the accounts.  On Aug. 4, 2014, the IRS increased the penalty to 50 percent if, at the time the taxpayer initiated their disclosure, either a foreign financial institution at which the taxpayer had an account or a facilitator who helped the taxpayer establish or maintain an offshore arrangement had been publicly identified as being under investigation, the recipient of a John Doe summons or cooperating with a government investigation, including the execution of a deferred prosecution agreement or non-prosecution agreement.  With today’s announcement of this non-prosecution agreement, noncompliant U.S. accountholders at SCB Switzerland must now pay that 50 percent penalty to the IRS if they wish to enter the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program.
The bank will be added to the IRS's Foreign Financial Institutions or Facilitators, here.  As indicated in the last quoted paragraph, accountholders in the listed banks joining OVDP after one of their banks are listed will be subject to the 50% penalty in OVDP (provided that they do not opt out, in which case, who knows).

Here are the updated statistics for the Swiss Bank Program:

US DOJ Swiss Bank Program
Number
Number Resolved
Total Costs
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 1 (Criminal Inv.) *
17
5
$3,470,550,000
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 2 **
87
52
$426,432,990
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 3
14

$0
   U.S. / Swiss Bank Initiative Category 4
8

$0
Swiss Bank Program Results
126

$3,896,982,990




* Includes subsidiary or related entities counted as separate entities, so the numbers may exceed the numbers the IRS and DOJ posted numbers which combine some of the entities.



** DOJ says original total was 106 but that it expects about 80 to complete the process.